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Constructive vote of no confidence : ウィキペディア英語版
Constructive vote of no confidence
The constructive vote of no confidence (in German: ''konstruktives Misstrauensvotum'', in Spanish: ''moción de censura constructiva'') is a variation on the motion of no confidence which allows a parliament to withdraw confidence from a head of government only if there is a positive majority for a prospective successor. The concept was invented in West Germany, but is today also used in other nations, such as Spain, Hungary, Lesotho, Israel, Poland, Slovenia, Albania and Belgium.
==Germany==
Governments in the 1919 Weimar Republic were usually very unstable. As there was no election threshold for getting a seat in the Reichstag, it was possible to get a seat with as little as 0.4 percent of the vote. This resulted in a large number of parties getting seats, making it very difficult for a government to retain a majority. Under the Weimar Constitution, a Chancellor (or ''Reichskanzler'' as he was then called) would frequently be voted out of office without his successor having sufficient backing to govern. This led to a quick succession of many Chancellors in office. Many of these chancellors were forced to rely on the emergency provisions of Article 48 just to conduct the basic business of government. In the latter years of the Weimar era, this frequently led to the imposition of cabinets that were dependent on the confidence of the President, Paul von Hindenburg. This instability was helped by and seen as contributing to the rise of the Nazi Party under Adolf Hitler.
To overcome this problem, two provisions were included in the 1949 German constitution, the ''Grundgesetz'' (Basic Law). They stipulate that the Chancellor, or ''Bundeskanzler'' (Federal Chancellor) as he is now called, may be removed from office by majority vote of the ''Bundestag'' ("Federal Diet", the lower chamber/house of the German Federal Parliament) only if a prospective successor also has the support of a majority. The relevant provisions are as follows:
: Article 67. (1) The Bundestag can express its lack of confidence in the Federal Chancellor only by electing a successor with the majority of its members and by requesting the Federal President to dismiss the Federal Chancellor. The Federal President must comply with the request and appoint the person elected.
: (2) Forty-eight hours must elapse between the motion and the election.
: Article 68. (1) If a motion of a Federal Chancellor for a vote of confidence is not assented to by the majority of the members of the Bundestag, the Federal President may, upon the proposal of the Federal Chancellor, dissolve the Bundestag within twenty-one days. The right to dissolve shall lapse as soon as the Bundestag with the majority of its members elects another Federal Chancellor.
: (2) Forty-eight hours must elapse between the motion and the vote thereon.
As a result, the failure of a motion of confidence does not automatically force either the resignation of the cabinet or a new election. Rather, the cabinet ''may'' continue as a minority government if there is not a positive majority for a prospective successor.
Also, the Federal President may dissolve the legislature ''only'' after the failure of a motion of confidence, and the legislature may not dissolve itself either. This provision is intended to limit the power of the President. One consequence of this is that in contrast to many other parliamentary democracies, the Chancellor does not petition the President to dissolve the legislature. Rather, in the past, the Chancellor deliberately loses a motion of confidence. However, this practice has been restricted by the Federal Constitutional Court since the election of Helmut Kohl in 1982.
While Carlo Schmid is generally considered to be the main contributor to this constitutional innovation, the concept was actually first introduced after World War I in the Free State of Prussia. Its existence was a major reason why that state was governed by a centre-left coalition without interruption from 1919 to 1932.

抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア(Wikipedia)
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